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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CLARK ROY FRIESEN, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Case No. 960005-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The State has appealed from an Order of Dismissal in a prosecution for Possession 
of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1996), following the granting of Appellee's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence. 
The appeal is not properly before this court for two reasons. First, the Order of 
Dismissal of the Information in this case did not state that the dismissal was with prejudice 
as required by State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993). Second, the trial Court did not 
certify that the evidence suppressed substantially impaired the prosecution's case as required 
by the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Troyer. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Does the State have the right to appeal where the order of dismissal does not 
provide that the dismissal is with prejudice and the trial court has made no finding or 
certification that the state's case is substantially impaired by the suppression of the evidence? 
2. Is the State prohibited from raising the issue of alternative justification for the 
traffic stop and detention of Defendant where the issue and argument was not raised at the 
trial Court level? 
3. Did the trial Court clearly err in finding that Trooper Wilson made an illegal stop 
of Defendant's vehicle where the Trooper did not know in fact, whether or not Defendant 
was violating the law of Wyoming. 
The trial Court's findings of fact are subject to a "clearly erroneous" standard of 
review and are reviewed deferentially. Conclusions of law are subject to review for 
"correctness." 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
RULES, ETC, 
IV AMENDMENT TO U.S. CONSTITUTION 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
ARTICLE IV SECTION 1 Privileges and immunities U.S. CONSTITUTION 
[1] The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities 
of Citizens in the several States. 
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4.305(5) 
(5) to operate upon any highway of this state any vehicle required by law to 
be registered without having the license plate or plates securely attached, and 
the registration card issued by the division carried in the vehicle, except that 
the registration card issued by the division to all trailers and semitrailers shall 
be carried in the towing vehicle; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Deter it Hstribute, a 
Third Degree Felony. Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress evidence seized pursuant to a 
warrantless search of his vehicle. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial Court granted 
entered a dismissal without designating the dismissal to be "with prejudice" and did not make 
am findings or certification that the granting of the suppression motion substantially 
impaired the ability of the state to proceet ( 'ill 11 i j > 11. -. 11 1 I' 11 \ i "') 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 20, 1997, Defendant was operating a vehicle validly licensed in the state 
of Wyoming. As he proceeded northbound approaching Nephi, Utah, Utah Highway 
* Wilson vs as observing traffic and noticed that Defendant's vehicle did not 
have a front license plate displayed. The trooper testified that the sole reason he stopped the 
vehicle with his overhead lights was that there was no front license plate displayed because 
! !
 »'• testified that t behind the 
vehicle he saw that it was a Wyoming vehicle and that he did not know whether or not failure 
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to display a Wyoming plate was a violation of Wyoming law. (75. 19-22) Trooper Wilson 
stated that as he approached the rear of the vehicle he determined that the rear plate was 
current. (75. 26) He testified that he thought the vehicle might be stolen because it did not 
display a front plate. (R. 75. 26) 
The trooper admitted that once he approached the vehicle, prior to any contact with 
the driver, he saw that the vehicle had a damaged front bumper and noticed the front plate 
on the dashboard. The trooper then testified that once he became aware that the vehicle in 
fact had two plates, his purpose for further detention was to see if the driver had a valid 
driver's license. (75. 24) 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision (a 
copy the Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Addendum A), finding that the 
officer's stop on fhe basis of the out-of-state vehicle not displaying a front licence plate did 
not amount to a reasonable suspicion that the driver was committing a crime since the officer 
observed a Wyoming rear plate before he stopped the vehicle and only "assumed" that 
Wyoming required a front plate be displayed. 
The State filed a motion for reconsideration based upon a stipulation by the parties 
that Wyoming does issue and require display of a front plate. The Court issued a second 
Memorandum Decision (a copy of the second Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as 
Addendum B). The Court determined that it did not matter whether or not Wyoming was 
one of those states which required the display of a front license plate since the officer 
assumed and did not know that fact at the time he stopped the motorist Defendant. 
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Upon motion by the State, the Court entered an Order of Dismissal (a copy of which 
is attached hereto as Addendum C) dismissing the Information against Defendant, but not 
with prejudice. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The appeal of the State from the ruling of the Court is improper since the State has 
a limited right to appeal governed by the conditions set forth in State v. Troyer, 866 P. 2d 
528 (Utah 1993), requiring that the trial Court certify that the suppression of evidence 
substantially impairs the prosecution's case, and the dismissal is with prejudice. In the 
present case, the dismissal of the Court did not state that it was with prejudice and there was 
no certification or finding by the Court that the prosecution's case was substantially impaired 
by the suppression of evidence. 
The State argues on appeal that although the the facts support the finding of the trial 
Court that the trooper's stop based upon the lack of a front license plate on Defendant's 
vehicle did not justify the stop, the Court should have considered an alternative basis for the 
trooper's stop, i.e., that the vehicle may have been stolen. However, that argument was not 
raised in the State's memorandum or in any argument submitted to the trial court. The State 
has raised the issue for the first time in this appeal. This Court should not consider an issue 
not raised during argument nor briefing at the trial Court level. 
The trial Court found from the evidence that the trooper did not know that Wyoming 
was one of those states which required a front hcense plate to be displayed. The Court ruled 
that the trooper did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle and that 
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the stop was unjustified. "The factual findings of the trial court underlying a trial court's 
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential 
clearly-erroneous standard, [but] the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a 
measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." 
State v. Moreno, 910 P. 2d 1245, at 1247 (Utah Ct. App.) cert. Denied, 916 P. 2d 909 (Utah 
1996). The findings of the Court were not clearly erroneous and the resulting decision was 
correct. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPEAL OF THE STATE IN THIS CASE IS IMPROPER SINCE 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF TROYER WERE NOT MET. 
The appeal of the State from the ruling of the Court is improper since the State has 
a limited right to appeal governed by the conditions set forth in State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 
(Utah 1993), requiring that the trial Court certify that the suppression of evidence 
substantially impairs the prosecution's case, and the dismissal is with prejudice. 
In Troyer, supra, at 866 P.2d 531, the Court stated the following: 
We will therefore review suppression orders on appeal from a dismissal only 
where the trial court certifies that the evidence suppressed substantially 
impairs the prosecution's case. 
Second, as a further safeguard, we will require the State to request dismissal 
with prejudice to obtain review of suppression orders on an appeal of right 
from a dismissal. In other words, if the orders are not affirmed on appeal, the 
State may not refile the charges. 
Hereafter, trial court certification as explained above will be required 
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before the State may appeal and seek review of suppression orders after 
dismissal. 
In the present case, the dismissal of the Court did not state that it was with prejudice 
and there was no certification or finding by the Court that the prosecution's case was 
substantially impaired by the suppression of evidence. The Order of Dismissal of the Court 
provided simply: "Based upon the foregoing Motion and good cause appearing therefore, the 
Court hereby dismisses the above case." See also State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 
1997). 
The motion of the State requesting dismissal did allege that the Order of Suppression 
impaired the prosecution of the case and did request the dismissal with prejudice; however, 
the Order (drafted by the State) did not set forth any certification or findings addressing that 
issue nor did the dismissal state it to be with prejudice. Under Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, a voluntary dismissal by Plaintiff is without prejudice unless otherwise 
specified in the order. See Career Service Review Bd. v. Utah Dept Of Corrections, 942 
P.2d 933. The appeal should be dismissed for lack of compliance with the conditions set by 
the appellate courts for a prosecution appeal. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF THE OFFICER'S 
REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP THE VEHICLE FOR 
REASONS OTHER THAN THE FAILURE TO DISPLAY A FRONT 
LICENSE PLATE DURING ARGUMENT OR BRIEFING AT THE 
TRIAL COURT LEVEL AND HAS THEREFORE WAIVED THAT 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
While admitting that the trial Court's finding is supported by trooper Wilson's 
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testimony, the State now argues that the Court "narrowly" focused on the trooper's 
assumption that the vehicle was being operated in violation of Wyoming law while 
overlooking the possibility that the trooper had other suspicion to justify the stop. The 
reason the decision of the trial Court did not address this argument is that it was never raised 
below. The parties briefed the issues and submitted written memoranda and argument. The 
State's Memorandum is attached as Addendum B to the Appellant's brief. The factual 
account in the Memorandum does not contain any reference to any other reason for stopping 
the vehicle other than no front plate. The argument of the State that the officer had 
reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle does not mention any other reason in addition to the 
no front plate and argued that "Trooper Wilson pulled Defendant over because Defendant 
was violating Utah law which required that vehicles registered in Wyoming must have front 
plates in Utah based upon § 41-la-1305(5) and § 41-la-404" 
Nor did the State raise the issue in the Motion for Reconsideration of Suppression and 
to Supplement the Record. The trial Court cannot be expected to consider arguments which 
are not presented to the Court and to opposing counsel. 
In State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1995), the appellate Court held that 
arguments and issues not raised at the trial Court level could not be raised for the first time 
on appeal. See also State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1990). The State should not be 
able to raise issues of justification for the stop which were not argued below. 
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POINT III 
THE FACTUAL FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE 
TRAFFIC STOP OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS UNJUSTIFIED 
IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CORRECT 
The trial Court found from the evidence that the trooper did not know that Wyoming 
was one of those states which required a front license plate to be displayed. This finding is 
clearly supported by the record in this case. The trooper testified that he assumed that not 
displaying a front license plate violated Wyoming's law but that he did not know. (75. 21-22) 
Further, the trooper testified that the only basis for his suspicion that the vehicle might be 
stolen was that there was no front plate on the vehicle. (75. 27) The totality of the record 
demonstrates that the reason the vehicle was stopped was because of the failure to display 
a front plate. There was nothing other than that fact upon which the trooper based any 
suspicion that the vehicle may have be a stolen vehicle. In addition, the trooper testified that 
he drove up past the vehicle and saw that the front bumper and grill had been damaged in the 
area where the front license plate would be displayed. (75. 5) Then as he approached the 
vehicle, he observed the front plate on the dashboard. (75. 5, 25) 
Further, the position of the trooper was that even though he was aware that there are 
states which do not require the display of a front plate, he considered it within his authority 
to stop any vehicle not complying with Utah registration requirements. (R.75 22-23) 
In State v. Tetmey, 947 P.2d 1157 (1997), the appellate Court found the officer's stop 
of a vehicle based upon the officer's observations of the driver and his passenger which led 
the officer to conclude the driver may have been driving impaired. The Court found that an 
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innocent explanation could easily be given for each of the observations of the officer upon 
which he based his suspicion. At 947 P.2d 1160, the Court observed: 
We hold that, taken together, these four articulated circumstances do not 
provide reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while under the 
influence. Instead, these circumstances "describe a very large category of 
presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random 
seizures were [we] to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this 
case could justify a seizure." Reidv. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 100 S.Ct. 
2752, 2754, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980). 
A Utah case which has more than passing similarities to the present case is that of State v. 
Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Ct. App. 1988). In Baird, Trooper Mangelson of the Utah Highway 
Patrol, stopped an Arizona vehicle which was northbound in the area of Nephi, Utah, 
because the sticker on the rear hcense plate did not appear to be valid. Although the trooper 
admitted he was unaware of the Arizona color scheme for stickers, he followed the car to 
determine if the year was valid. After stopping the car, the trooper determined that the year 
was in fact valid. After stopping the vehicle and determining that the plate was current, the 
trooper made other observations which the State attempted to use to justify the stop such as 
the vehicle had new tire and shocks, a twisted off gas cap, a jack in the back seat, the 
defendant's confusion about ownership, and the smell of marijuana. The appellate Court 
rejected this reasoning, stating: 
While this may have justified a further inquiry of the driver after a valid stop, 
such articulable suspicion must be present at the time of the stop and must be 
the reason for the stop. In this case, no reasonable or articulable suspicion 
existed to justify the stop. The evidence used to convict defendant was 
derived by exploitation of the impermissible stop. 763 P.2d at 1217. 
Of particular interest is footnote 1 to the decision concerning to the reason for the 
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stop. Footnote 1 observes: "If this is sufficient reason to stop, every out-of-state vehicle may 
be stopped for no other reason other than the officer's ignorance of the license plate sticker 
color code." 763 P.2d at 1217. 
The same observation applies to the present case. If not displaying a front license 
plate is sufficient cause to stop an out-of-state vehicle, then any such vehicle may be stopped 
for no other reason than the officer's ignorance of the vehicle registration requirements of 
the state in which the vehicle is registered. Under a totality of the circumstances analysis, 
the trooper's concern became substantially diluted once he saw the damaged area on the front 
bumper and grill since there would be an obviously innocent explanation of the reason there 
was no front plate. Further, when, as the trooper approached the vehicle, he saw the front 
plate on the dashboard, that fact would further dilute any suspicion that the officer might 
otherwise have based upon the failure to display a front plate. 
The Court ruled that the trooper did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop 
the vehicle and that the stop was unjustified. "The factual findings of the trial court 
underlying a trial courts decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed 
under the deferential clearly-erroneous standard, [but] the legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal 
standard to the facts." State v. Moreno, 910 P. 2d 1245, at 1247 (Utah Ct. App.) cert 
Denied, 916 P. 2d 909 (Utah 1996). The record clearly supports the ruling of the trial Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The appeal of the State should be dismissed for failure to meet the requirements of 
11 
Troyer. The argument of the State concerning alternative basis to justify the traffic stop and 
detention of Defendant cannot be considered as that argument and issue was not raised 
below. The factual findings of the trial Court determining that the stop for no front license 
plate to be unjustified is supported by the facts and admitted by the State in its brief. The 
ruling of the trial Court suppressing the evidence should be upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of March, 1999. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN ~^ 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this 15th day of March, 1999, two 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Defendant-Appellee to the following: 
Marian Decker 
Assistant Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
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ADDENDUM 
U.S. Constitution, IV Amendment 
U.S. Constitution, Article IV Section 1, Privileges and immunities 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-404. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305(5) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1996) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41 
Addendum A - Memorandum Decision (June 2, 1998) 
Addendum B - Memorandum Decision (August 18, 1998) 
Addendum C - Motion and Order of Dismissal 
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IV AMENDMENT TO U.S. CONSTITUTION 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
ARTICLE IV SECTION 1 Privileges and immunities U.S. CONSTITUTION 
[1] The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities 
of Citizens in the several States. 
U.C.A. § 41-la-1305(5) 
(5) to operate upon any highway of this state any vehicle required by law to 
be registered without having the license plate or plates securely attached, and 
the registration card issued by the division carried in the vehicle, except that 
the registration card issued by the division to all trailers and semitrailers shall 
be carried in the towing vehicle; 
611 MOTOR VEHICLES- 41-la-404 
shall notify the division «and surrender the registration 
card and license plate of the withdrawn vehicle. 
(11) (a) An out-of-state carrier with an apportionally regis-
tered vehicle who has not presented a certificate of 
property tax or in lieu fee as required by Section 41-la-
206 or 41-la-207, shall pay, at the time of registration, a 
proportional part of an equalized highway use tax com-
puted as follows: 
(i) Multiply the number of vehicles or combination 
vehicles registered in each weight class by the 
equivalent tax figure from the following tables: 
Vehicle or 
Combination 
Registered 
Weight 
12,000 pounds 
or less 
12,000 pounds 
or less 
12,000 pounds 
or less 
12,000 pounds 
for less 
12,000 pounds 
« or leas 
Age of Vehicle 
12 or more years 
9 or more years but 
less than 12 years 
6 or more years but 
less than 9 years 
3 or more years but 
less than 6 years 
, Less than 3 years 
„ Vehicle" or 'Combination 
* * *-T> *»'• 1*'*" JTTT • 1.A 
r I^gwteredTVeight. 12,001-^-18,000 pounds 
vi8,0dV—34,000 pounds 
,534,001 ^ 4 ^ , 0 0 0 pounds 
'48,001 ^ 6 ^ 0 0 0 po'unds 
64,001 .pounds and over 
Equivalent 
Tax 
$10 
$50 
$80 
$110 
$150 
Equivalent 
Tax 
$150 
200 
300 
450 
600 
<M
 (ii) Multiply the equivalent tax value for the total 
fleet/determined under Subsection (HXaXi) by the 
^fraction Computed under Subsection (3) for the appor-
tioned fleet "for the registration year. - i 3 i ' 
(b)' Fees shall he assessed as provided in Section 41-la-
1207iji*'*rv?)*«^ -*'{ ** ic « * : * « . . . » , 
(12)r(a) ^mmerc ia l vehicles meeting the registration re-
quirements of another jurisdiction may, as an alternative 
•to rfull*6r ^ port ioned registration,'secure a temporary 
registration permit for a period not to exceed 96 hours or 
until the^rieaVe the state, whichever is less, for a fee of 
$20 for a single unit and $40 for multiple units. -
b
 (b) A state temporary permit or registration fee is not 
required from nonresident owners or operators of vehicles 
or combination of vehicles having a gross laden weight of 
•26,000 pounds' or less for each single unit or combination. 
1998 
41-la-302^-RepealeoV 1996 
PART 4 ' 
LICENSE PLATES AND REGISTRATION INDICIA 
41-la-401. -: License • plates — • N u m b e r . of plates — 
Reflectorization — Indic ia of registration in 
w * B ^ .,5*5 l ieu of or used,with plates . ^ 
(1) (a) The division upon registering a vehicle shall issue to 
the owner-one license plate ifor a motorcycle, trailer, or 
i^-jtHBemitrailerjejid two identical license plates for-every other 
vehicle. &£&n *• , t*c o>- +r * . t , . m<st*z*j, 
ssre if I (b)oilhe license, plate shall be issued for^the particular 
vehicle v registered and inay^not >be, removed during the 
d W term fo*<which4he license plate is issued or used upon any
 v 
-' othertfehiclejthan -the. registered.vehicle^ c & a*j 
(2) The division may receive applications for registration 
renewal, renew registration, and issue new license plates or 
decals at any time prior to the expiration of registration. 
(3) (a) All Ucense plates to be manufactured and issued by 
the division shall be treated with a fully reflective mate-
rial on the plate face that provides effective and depend-
able reflective brightness during the service period of the 
license plate. 
(b) The division shall prescribe all license plate mate-
rial specifications and establish and implement proce-
dures for conforming to the specifications 
(c) The specifications for the materials used such as the 
aluminum plate substrate, the reflective sheeting, and 
glue shall be drawn in a manner so that at least two 
manufacturers may qualify as suppliers 
(d) The granting of contracts for the materials shall be 
by public bid. 
(4) (a) The commission may issue, adopt, and require the 
use of indicia of registration it considers advisable in lieu 
of or in conjunction with license plates as provided in this 
part 
(b) All provisions of this part relative to license plates 
apply to these indicia of registration, so far as the provi-
sions are applicable. 1992 
41-la-402. Required colors, numerals , and letters — 
Expiration. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), each license plate 
shall be-in colors selected by the commission and shall have 
displayed on it: -
(a) the registration number assigned to the vehicle for 
which it is issued;
 } - r 
, • Xb) the name of the state; 
(c) a designation of the county in which the vehicle is 
registered as provided in Section 41-la-406; 
(d) the date of expiration; and 
(e) a slogan determined as provided in Section 41-la-
(2) If registration i s extended by affixing a validation decal 
to the license, plate, the expiration date of the decal governs 
the expiration date of the license plate. ^ **•
 t, 
(3) beginning July 1,1997;, .each original license plate that 
is not one of
 (the,apecial group license plates issued under 
Section 41-la-408.§hall t e j ^ "t ,J ' \ \ *\'* '\v\ J 
(a) statehood ^ centennial license plate with the same 
color,'design, and slogan as the plates issued in conjunc-
tion with the statehood centennial; or J / * '!'*' 
* (b) Ski Utah license plate. ' f 1997 
41-la-403. Plates to' be legible from 100 feet. •> 
'License plates and the required letters and numerals on 
them, except the decals and the slogan, shall be of sufficient 
size to be plainly readable from a distance of 100 feet during 
daylight. *j >***'ii \ - -«L*I * *l •«i«K*w 1992 
- . ""^  */>' f' 
41-la-404, -Location and posi t ion of plates. ^ , ;r. 
(1) License plates issued for a vehicle, otherjthan a motor-
cycle, trailer, or semitrailer shall be attached to the vehicle, 
one in the front and the other in the rear. 
(2) The license plate issued for a motorcycle, trailer, or 
semitrailer shall be attached to the rear of the motorcycle, 
trailer, or semitrailer. «•
 }\. t - ^ ^ . , , 1 , . t 0 ) r 
: ,<3) Every license plate shall at alljtimes be:«, . >
 l(i 
i> biJa) securely fastened:-;^o, y>j „** wn.f-rrr; ;} 
- ..r Mrt! *v iii) i n a horizontal position to the vehicle for which 
r » ?rr» * i t is issued io prevent ^ the plate from swinging; r «-. 
7o.*£ttnoifii0i)>*t a height of^not less thantl2Jnches from the 
&s/o*« 3 J groundVmeasuring from theJbottom^£the>plate; and 
- - _
 ,n« 4,w)ipn a place and position tfi^e clearjyyjsible; and 
(b) maintained:> Hawqcino w tn*aux$irx& 
(i) free from foreign materials; and 
OiHn a condition to be clearly legible. 
207 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 58-37-8 
58-37-8. Prohibi ted acts — Penalt ies . 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful 
for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess 
with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, 
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance 
with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise 
where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages 
in conduct which results in any violation of any 
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, 
or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing 
series of two or more violations of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate 
occasions that are undertaken in concert with 
five or more persons with respect to whom the 
person occupies a position of organizer, supervi-
sor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXa) 
with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a 
controlled substance analog is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent con-
viction is guilty of a first degree felony, i 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule HI or IV, or 
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon 
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subse-
quent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
QXaXiv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 
' seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence-may not be suspended, and the 
' person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly 
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by 
this subsection; * - > ^ _ , - »«•. v , « . *. 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in 
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, 
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to 
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully 
possessing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
stances in any of those locations; or - < 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess an altered or forged prescription or written 
order for a controlled substance. r 
(b) Any person convicted >t)f violating. Subsection 
(2XaXi) with respect to: wim *tU< v * r - . . J. 
J' <i). marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, 
4s guilty of a second degree felony; i <>VJ > 
' (ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, mari-
juana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less 
.than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is 
guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form 
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and 
the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2XaXi) while inside the exterior boundaries of property 
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than 
provided in Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of posses-
sion of any controlled substance by a person, that person 
shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with 
respect to all other controlled substances not included in 
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one 
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction 
the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2XaXU) or (2Xa)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misde-
meanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
>(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and inten-
-tionally: 
Ai) to use in the course of the manufacture or 
distribution of a controlled substance a license num-
ber which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued 
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a 
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or repre-
sent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apoth-
ecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other au-
thorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or 
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a 
- prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to ^uiy per-
son known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure 
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled 
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, decep-
tion, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription orwrit-
ten order for a controlled substance, or the use of a 
false name or address; - ,s 
> (iii) to make any'false or forged prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter 
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order 
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, 
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, 
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, 'or other 
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any 
1
 likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or 
container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance, -vu, nvq J 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection t3Xa) 
is guilty of a third degree felony. * *n \ ^J - zirl ' t 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:<>•' J t - ' i f i f f i r*jirl 
7- (a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section} a 
person not authorized under this chapter-*who!commits 
any act declared to be unlawful under this section,-Title 
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act,Tor under 
701 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 42 
Rule 39. Trial by jury or by the court. 
(a) By jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as 
provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the 
register of actions as a jury action. The trial of all issues so 
demanded shall be by jury, unless 
(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written 
stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation made 
in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the 
court sitting without a jury, or 
(2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that 
a right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not 
exist, or 
(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial 
(b) By the court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury as 
provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwith-
standing the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in 
which such a demand might have been made of right, the court 
in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any 
or all issues. 
(c) Advisory jury and trial by consent. In all actions not 
triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own 
initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, with the 
consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose 
verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter 
of right. 
Rule 40. Ass ignment of cases for trial; continuance. 
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide 
by rule for the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1) 
without request of the parties or (2) upon request of a party 
and notice to the other parties or (3) in such other manner as 
the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to 
actions entitled thereto by s tatute . 
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the 
court may in i ts discretion, and upon such terms as may be 
just, including the payment of costs occasioned by such post-
ponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause 
shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence 
of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of 
the evidence expected to be obtained and shall show that due 
diligence has been used to procure it. The court may also 
require the, party seeking the continuance to state, upon 
affidavit or under, oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and 
if the adverse party thereupon admits tha t such evidence 
would be given, and tha t it may be considered as actually 
given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the 
trial shall not be postponed upon tha t ground. 
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present. If required by the 
adverse party, the court shall, as a condition to such postpone-
ment, proceed to have the testimony of any witness present 
taken, in the same manner as if a t the trial; and the testimony 
so taken may be read on the trial with the same effect, and 
subject to the same objections tha t may be made with respect 
to a deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(c)(1) and (2) 
[Rule 32(c)(3XA) and (B)]. 
Rule 41. Dismissal of act ions . 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of 
Rule 66(i), and of any applicable statute, an action may be 
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a 
notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse 
party of an answer or other response to the complaint permit-
ted under these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of 
dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice,' except tha t a 
notice'of dismissal operates a s . a n adjudication upon the 
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any 
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or 
including the same claim. 
(2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a 
notice of dismissal under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of 
this rule, an action may only be dismissed a t the request of the 
plaintiff on order of the court based either on: 
(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in 
the action; or 
(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems 
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant 
prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to 
dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defen-
dant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending 
for mdependent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise 
specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is 
without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the 
plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any 
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action 
or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action 
tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presenta-
tion of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to 
offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may 
move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the 
law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier 
of the facts may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment 
until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders 
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall 
make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in 
its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under 
this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this 
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for 
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates 
as an adjudication upon the merits. >> v - ^  - u ~* ?, 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim. The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary 
dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of 
Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction 
of evidence a t the trial or hearing. f\
 u~> * . 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who 
has once dismissed an action in any court commences an 
action based upon or including the same claim-against the 
same defendant, the court may make such order for the 
payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may 
deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until 
the plaintiff has complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. 
Should a party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (aXIXi) 
above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party, 
the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional 
remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court 'to the 
adverse party against whom such provisional remedy was 
obtained. 
Rule 42. Consol idation; separate trials. 
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common ques-
tion of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a 
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the 
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may 
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend 
to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. 
• (b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance of convenience 
or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, 
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, .or of.any 
ADDENDUM A 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (June 2, 1998) 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
CLARK ROY FRJJESEN, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 971400205 
DATE: June 2,1998 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
LAW CLERK: David Sturgill 
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Having 
received and considered the Motion and a supporting memorandum, the Court hereby grants the 
Motion and delivers the following Memorandum Decision. 
Statement of Facts 
On or about October 20,1997, UHP officer Charlie Wilson observed Defendant 
traveling northbound on 1-15. The officer noticed Defendant's vehicle did not have a front license 
plate, and decided to pull Defendant over. Before the officer signaled to Defendant to stop, he 
observed a Wyoming license plate displayed on the rear bumper of Defendant's vehicle. 
The officer testified at the preliminary hearing that the only reason he stopped 
Defendant was because of the missing front plate. He testified that he knew some states did not 
require a front license plate, but was not sure of the Wyoming requirement. The officer testified 
that he "assumed" Wyoming required two license plates since he had seen other Wyoming cars 
display both front and rear plates. 
The officer made contact with Defendant and was provided a valid driver's license and 
vehicle registration. At that point, the officer testified that he detected the odor of marijuana. 
The officer asked Defendant for consent to search his vehicle, to which Defendant reluctantly 
responded "if you have to." The search eventually produced a 12 pound bag of marijuana. 
Opinion of the Court 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: Mthe right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated [.]M U.S. CONST, amend IV; see also UTAH CONST, art. I, § 
12. The concern of the Fourth Amendment is against "unreasonable" or unjustified searches and 
seizures—"reasonable" searches and seizures are constitutionally valid. Although the expectation 
of privacy in a vehicle is less than that of a home, "one does not lose the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment while in an automobile." State v. SchlosserT 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). 
In Utah, a peace officer may stop and question a person, without violating the Fourth 
Amendment, "when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, 
or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994) 
{quoting United States v. Flaw, 462 U.S. 696, 702-03 (1983)). 
In this case, Officer Wilson testified at the preliminary hearing that the only reason he 
stopped Defendant was because of the missing front license plate. He admitted that he wasn't 
sure whether vehicles registered in Wyoming were required to display front plates. He "assumed" 
they were because he had observed other Wyoming vehicles with front plates. The officer's 
"assumption" does not support a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal 
activity. A number of lawful reasons could have existed to explain the absence of a front plate-
one being that Wyoming law does not require them. 
The State cites Utah Code Annotated § 41-1A-1305. That section provides that it is a 
Class "C" Misdemeanor for any person to "operate on any highway of this state any vehicle 
required by law to be registered without having license plates or plate securely attached." The 
State argues that the statute does not exempt vehicles licensed in other jurisdictions. Assuming 
the State's interpretation of the statute is correct, that does not cure the officer's "assumption" of 
Wyoming's license plate requirement. The officer noticed Defendant's vehicle was registered in 
Wyoming before he pulled him over. At that time, the officer did not know whether Wyoming 
vehicles were required to display both front and rear license plates. Clearly, the officer cannot 
enforce a law that he merely "assumed" existed. Officer Wilson should have discontinued his 
pursuit of Defendant and allowed him to proceed without interruption. 
2 
The State claims "[cjlearly the faint smell of marijuana gives rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that there was marijuana in the car[.]" While this may have justified a further inquiry of 
the driver after a valid stop, such articulable suspicion must be present at the time of the stop and 
must be the reason for the stop. In this case, no reasonable or articulable suspicion existed to 
justify the stop. Furthermore, the unjustified stop negates any subsequent consent to search 
Defendant's vehicle. 
The bag of marijuana discovered in Defendant's vehicle was derived by exploitation of 
an impermissible stop. Because none of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule apply, the 
evidence will be suppressed. 
Order 
Accordingly, the defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby granted. 
DATED this ^ day of June, 1998. 
cc: David O. Leavitt, Juab County Attorney 
Michael D. Espiin, Attorney for Defendant 
3 
ADDENDUM B 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (August 18, 1998) 
r-?*r 
'•-•^HirifD £ij3 2^1998 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
CLARK ROY FRIESEN, 
PlaintuT, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 971400205 
DATE: August 18, 1998 
JUDGE: RAYM. HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
LAW CLERK: DaveBackman 
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of 
Suppression and to Supplement the Record. The Court sees no reason to reconsider the decision 
to suppress evidence. Mr. Esplin's stipulation that Wyoming law requires a front license plate has 
no bearing on the Court's decision since it does not change the fact that the oflBcer assumed and 
did not know that Wyoming requires two license plates. Having received and considered the 
Motion and the stipulation, the Court hereby denies the Motion. 
DATED t h i s / / day of August, 1998. 
cc: David O. Leavitt, Juab County Attorney 
Michael D. Esplin, Attorney for Defendant 
ADDENDUM C 
MOTION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
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David O. Leavitt, No. 5990 
Juab County Attorney 
146 North Main 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: (435) 623-1141 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
** JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
MOTION AND ORDER OF 
Plaintiff, DISMISSAL 
vs. Criminal No. 971400205 
CLARK ROY FRTESEN, 
Defendant. 
The State of Utah, through the Juab County Attorney, hereby moves the court to dismiss 
the above entitled action against the defendants on the ground that the suppression order will 
substantially impair the prosecution's ability to proceed in the case. See State vs. Troyer, 866 
P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1993). Therefore, the State moves to dismiss the above entitled case with 
prejudice. 
Dated this / L ^ day of I-^pliw. L - ^ . 1998. 
RECEIVED OCT 
l 
(\)cj]&j~J 
David O. Leavitt 
Juab County Attorney 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Motion and good cause appearing therefore, the Court hereby 
dismisses the above case. 
Dated this /y7 day oi^-J**£a£ 
District Judg^y^ 
STATE CF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY CF JUAB) 
:. *hz undesigned, Clerk of the* Fourth District Court 
-:•; .}±zb County, Utsh, do hereby certify that the 
• -.;8c-y.ec:: i-nd -orezvpz Is s true and full copy of the 
•.:••-'•• Socur^m on file if? my c"t;C3 ss such Clark^ 
*':•?.zz-i^-i ny r^nci ?.:-d sea: o? said Ccurt this j£^fcfr\ 
^ U M 
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